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Abstract
An outbreak in China in April 2013 of human illnesses due to avian influenza A(H7N9) virus 
provided reason for U.S. public health officials to revisit existing national pandemic response 
plans. We built a spreadsheet model to examine the potential demand for invasive mechanical 
ventilation (excluding “rescue therapy" ventilation). We considered scenarios of either 20% or 
30% gross influenza clinical attack rate (CAR), with a “low severity” scenario with case fatality 
rates (CFR) of 0.05%–0.1%, or a “high severity” scenario (CFR: 0.25%–0.5%). We used rates-of-
influenza-related illness to calculate the numbers of potential clinical cases, hospitalizations, 
admissions to intensive care units (ICUs), and need for mechanical ventilation. We assumed 10 
days ventilator use per ventilated patient, 13% of total ventilator demand will occur at peak, and a 
33.7% weighted average mortality risk while on a ventilator. At peak, for a 20% CAR, low 
severity scenario, an additional 7,000 to 11,000 ventilators will be needed, averting a pandemic 
total of 35,000 to 55,000 deaths. A 30% CAR, high severity scenario, will need approximately 
35,000 to 60,500 additional ventilators, averting a pandemic total 178,000 to 308,000 deaths. 
Estimates of deaths averted may not be realized because successful ventilation also depends on 
sufficient numbers of suitably trained staff, needed supplies (e.g., drugs, reliable oxygen sources, 
suction apparatus, circuits, and monitoring equipment) and timely ability to match access to 
ventilators with critically ill cases. There is a clear challenge to plan and prepare to meet demands 
for mechanical ventilators for a future severe pandemic.
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An outbreak of human illnesses due to avian influenza A(H7N9) virus was first reported in 
eastern China by the World Health Organization on April 1, 2013 [1]. Since that time, 
approximately 36% of H7N9 cases have experienced severe respiratory disease and have 
died [2]. Limited human-to-human H7N9 virus transmission could not be excluded in some 
case clusters in China, although to date, there has been no evidence of sustained human-to-
human transmission [3,4]. These events provided reason for U.S. public health officials to 
revisit existing national plans for the response to influenza pandemics. We provide in this 
paper a description of a simple model that we used to estimate the potential number of 
patients in the United States that would require mechanical ventilation during their 
influenza-related hospitalizations for influenza pandemics of varying severities. We also 
estimate the potential number of premature deaths averted due to the use of such ventilators. 
This will help public health officials evaluate the impact of stockpiling ventilators across 
multiple pandemic influenza scenarios, and assess the potential costs and benefits of 
increasing existing stockpiles of mechanical ventilators.
Methods
General description
We built a spreadsheet model to examine the potential need for, and potential impact of, 
mechanical ventilators in the next influenza pandemic. We considered only the demand for 
invasive mechanical ventilation, and excluded consideration of “rescue therapy” ventilation 
such as high-frequency oscillatory ventilation or extracorporeal membrane oxygenation. We 
used rates-of-influenza-related illness to calculate the numbers of potential clinical cases, 
hospitalizations, admittances to intensive care units (ICUs), and those ICU patients who will 
need mechanical ventilation to improve their chances of survival. Due to limitations in the 
data, we were not able to estimate these rates by age of patient, and therefore distinguish 
between the need for neonatal, pediatric and adult ventilators. We considered four 
standardized pandemic scenarios [5]. These scenarios had either a 20% or a 30% gross 
influenza clinical attack rate of the entire U.S. population. Then, for each clinical attack rate, 
we defined two levels of clinical severity. We defined “low severity” as having a range of 
case fatality rate (CFR) of 0.05%–0.1% of all cases, and “high severity” as having a CFR 
range of 0.25%–0.5% (Table 1).
These estimates of hospitalizations, ICU admissions and percent of those admitted to the 
ICU that are placed on ventilators provide estimates of total patients-on-ventilators. Since 
ventilators are a reusable resource (i.e., one ventilator can be used in sequence for several 
patients), the maximum demand for ventilators will occur at the peak of the pandemic. We 
thus calculated the number of ventilators needed at peak using the following general 
equation:
We describe later the calculations of the percentage of ventilators needed at peak.
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There are two issues that impact the potential number of premature deaths prevented due to 
the use of mechanical ventilators (both total and at peak demand). These are the severity of 
illness of those placed on mechanical ventilation, and the effectiveness of such ventilation. 
We used the following two general equations to calculate the number of premature deaths 
averted.
We calculated the weighted average mortality in ventilated patients as the weighted average 
of risk of mortality in “high severity illness upon admission to ICU” and “lower severity 
illness upon admission to ICU” patients, with the weights being the distribution of patients 
in each category of severity score (details described later).
Estimating ventilators at peak
We used an estimate of 13% of total ventilator demand will occur at peak (Table 1). We 
estimated this using a combination of 2 elements: i) Duration of a given patient on a 
ventilator, and, ii) Shape of the epidemic curve, which determines the number of patients at 
peak.
We assumed each patient would be mechanically ventilated for 8 days with an additional 2 
days needed for cleaning, maintenance and other such functions, for a total of 10 days. 
These values used for time-on-ventilator accord well with reported estimates. For example, 
in Australia and New Zealand, in the 2010 influenza season, ventilated patients were on a 
ventilator for 8.5 days (range: 3.2–25.6), and 7 days (range: 3.0–16) for the 2009 season [6]. 
In Canada, among ventilated patients, those who survived were on a ventilator for a median 
of 12 days (25th and 75th percentiles, inter quartile range, IQR: 5–22 days), and non-
survivors a median of 12 days (IQR: 4–20 days) [7]. Similarly, ventilated 2009 influenza 
A(H1N1) patients in Mexico who survived had median of 15 days (IQR: 8–26 days) on a 
mechanical ventilator, while non-survivors had a median of 7.5 days (IQR: 3–13.5 days) [8]. 
Pereira et al., reporting on a study that enrolled patients from 31 countries, found that those 
placed on mechanical ventilation stayed on ventilation for a median of 12 days (IQR: 8–20 
days) [9].
For simplicity, to assess the percentage of ventilated patients that will occur at the pandemic 
peak, we did not use a standardized epidemiological curve for a hypothetical H7N9-related 
pandemic [5]. We instead distributed total cases-over-time using a Gamma probability 
distribution (Table 1). For an approximately 30% clinical attack rate, we estimated that the 
peak 20 days of the outbreak accounts for approximately 26% of all ventilated cases 
(unpublished data). Thus, using the described 26% of all ventilated patients that occur within 
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a 20 day peak period, and an average of 10 days per ventilator per patient, then the peak 
demand for ventilators is equivalent to 13% of all ventilated cases.
In comparison, if standardized curves are used for this computation [5], then for the 30% 
clinical attack rate, and assuming a pandemic start with 100 clinically ill persons, the peak 
20 days of the curve accounts for approximately 60.5 million cases. This is equivalent to 
approximately 64% of all cases, and 32% for a 10 day peak period. Using the standardized 
20% attack rate curve, the number of cases at peak 20 days was approximately 27.0 million 
cases, equivalent to approximately 43% of all cases, and 22% of a 10 day peak period. Thus, 
the net effect of using an alternative distribution of cases over time is that our estimates of 
demand for ventilators at peak are approximately 1.6–2.3 times smaller (assuming equal risk 
of need of ventilation throughout the pandemic) than if we used the standardized, 20% or 
30%, attack rate curves [5]. We also conducted sensitivity analyses to test the impact of 
assuming that peak demand was a larger percentage of total ventilator demand (see later).
Impact: Deaths averted
Quantitative predictors of surviving pandemic illness while being mechanically ventilated 
include the Sequential Organ Failure Score (SOFA) and the Acute Physiology and Chronic 
Health Evaluation, version III (APACHE III) scoring systems [10]. Ferreira et al [11] report 
that they were able to use patient SOFA scores to predict mortality as follows: “… the 
mortality rate [of those on ventilators] was at least 50% when the score increased [indicating 
worsening physical condition], 27% to 35% when it remained unchanged, and less than 27% 
when it decreased.” Other references provide similar estimates of mortality [6–8, 12–17].
Calculating a weighted average risk of mortality
We found from the literature (Table A1) that approximately 30% of ventilated cases can be 
classified as “high score” (i.e., relatively high severity of clinical illness upon admittance to 
ICU) and 70% as “low score” (Table 2). We defined, following Ferreira et al (10), high 
score as those patients with a SOFA score greater than 8 (i.e., > 8). We then calculated a 
weighted average risk of mortality for all patients who are placed on a ventilator. First, we 
calculated a weighted average mortality of 54% for 63 “high score” patients that Ferreira et 
al [11] had placed into 4 groups by mortality rates (the calculation was: [(17/63 × 0.05 
mortality rate) + (5/63×0.99) + (30/63 ×0.60) + (11/63 × 0.90)] = 0.54). Similarly, for 141 
“low score” patients in the same study, we calculated a weighted average mortality of 25% 
(the calculation is: [(0/141 × 0.00) + (44/141×0.05) + (16/141 ×0.00) + (81/141 × 0.0.40)] = 
0.25) (Table 2). The weighted average mortality risk while on a ventilator is then 33.7% 
(calculated by: (0.30 × .54) + (0.70 × .25)).
Sensitivity analyses—The 4 scenarios describing 2 different clinical attacks and two 
levels of clinical severity allow for a great deal of variability in estimates of ventilator 
demand. As already described, however, the shape of the epidemic curve can also impact 
estimates of peak demand. Further, during a pandemic with a 30% clinical attack rate, the 
health care system will likely be greatly burdened, creating the potential for possible delays 
in receiving care. We therefore re-calculated the outputs by changing two input values. First, 
we increased, from 13% to 30%, the percentage of total ventilator demand that occurs at 
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peak. We calculated this increase by multiplying by 2.3 the original number of ventilated 
patients at peak (see earlier). This higher limit represents the possible percentage if we used 
the standardized curves at a 30% clinical attack rate, and examines the impact of different 
shaped pandemic curves (see Figure 3 in 4). Simultaneously, to illustrate the potential 
impact of delays in receiving care, and/or possible problems in supply of ventilator ancillary 
parts and other items need to ensure maximum effectiveness of a mechanical ventilator, we 
increased the risk of mortality whilst ventilated from 33.7% to 50%. This higher mortality 
percentage is similar to the mortality measured among “high SOFA score” patients [11]. 
Neither of these additional sensitivity analyses change the estimates of overall impact of 
pandemic (cases, hospitalizations, deaths), or the estimates of total patients needing 
ventilation (impact of such differences are examined in the original 4 scenarios).
RESULTS
We present In Table 3 the calculated health outcomes (before interventions are applied), the 
number of ventilators needed (total and at peak), and number of deaths averted. The number 
of ventilators needed at peak range from approximately 7,000 to 11,000 (20% clinical attack 
rate, low severity) to approximately 35,000 to 60,500 (30% clinical attack rate, high 
severity) (Table 3). The total number of ventilator-related averted deaths range from 
approximately 35,000 to 55,000 (20% clinical attack rate, low severity) to approximately 
178,000 to 308,000 (30% clinical attack rate, high severity) (Table 3).
Of note is that, for a given level of severity, there is some overlap in the ranges of estimates 
produced by the two clinical attack rates. For example, for high severity clinical attack 
scenarios, the number of deaths averted at 20% clinical attack rate ranges from 
approximately 119,000 to 206, 000, and for 30% clinical attack rate from 178,000 to 
308,000 (Table 3). There are no similar overlaps when comparing results from high severity 
scenarios to low severity scenarios.
Sensitivity analysis
The impact of increasing both the percentages of total ventilated patients that occur at peak, 
and the rate of mortality while ventilated, are shown in Table 4. Multiplying by 2.3 the 
initial percentage of ventilated patients at peak produced the expected large changes. For 
example, at a 20% clinical attack rate, and using a high severity scenario, the upper limit of 
the estimated range of ventilators needed at peak went from approximately 40,000 to 93,000 
(Table 4). Clearly, the assumed shape of the epidemic curve and the resultant percentage of 
ventilated cases greatly impact any estimate of peak ventilator demand.
Similarly, increasing the probability of mortality while ventilated from 33.7% to 50% 
caused a notable decrease in total deaths averted (Table 4).
Discussion
We estimated that mechanical ventilators could, in theory, prevent notable numbers of 
premature deaths among patients who become severely ill from pandemic influenza. The 
numbers of deaths averted greatly depended upon the actual scenario. For example, for a 
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pandemic that caused (before any effective mitigation) a 20% clinical attack rate and 
relatively low rates of severity, mechanical ventilators could prevent a maximum of 
approximately 35,000 to 55,000 deaths. But, for the same attack rate, successful use of 
ventilators during a pandemic characterized as a high severity could prevent a maximum of 
119,000 to 206,000 deaths. Other critical factors impacting the estimates of ventilator 
needed at peak and the potential deaths averted include the assumed shape of the epidemic 
curve (and thus percentage of total cases occurring at peak demand), and the effectiveness of 
ventilation.
It is not possible to predict which pandemic scenario is likely to next occur. Therefore, the 
scenarios used for this analysis may under or overestimate the potential need for mechanical 
ventilation associated with a future novel influenza outbreak. For example, as demonstrated 
in the sensitivity analyses, peak demand may be notably different than modeled here. 
Additionally, public health interventions, such as closing of schools, or mass vaccination 
campaigns may further change the shape of the epidemic curve, and prompt treatment with 
medications may also reduce the number of patients at peak requiring ventilation (Fung et al, 
2014 unpublished).
An equally important limitation in interpreting these results is the assumption that the 
distribution of existing ventilators across the United States is well matched to the needs of 
sick patients. Adequate geographic distribution of existing and stockpiled ventilators, and 
timely access to mechanical ventilation when needed, will impact outcomes during a 
pandemic [18,19]. Once stockpiled ventilators are allocated to hospitals, it will be very 
difficult to re-call and re-distribute ventilators. Public health officials may not be able to 
assess in a timely manner where there is a surplus of ventilators and where there is a surplus 
demand for ventilators, thus limiting ability to meet urgent changing demands for 
ventilators.
In addition, the estimates of ventilators needed for a future pandemic and the number of 
deaths averted depend not just on the availability of mechanical ventilators, but also the 
capacity of the health care system to absorb and use additional mechanical ventilators (Ajao 
et al., in preparation). This includes having sufficient numbers of trained staff (respiratory 
therapists, nurses, and physicians) for the successful clinical management of ventilated 
patients. Staff absenteeism due to pandemic-related illnesses may further exacerbate the 
situation. The hospital also must have available space to care of large number of critically ill 
patients. Lastly, the system considerations should include having sufficient quantities of 
equipment and supplies to use ventilators in multiple patients (circuits, oxygen etc) during a 
pandemic. Such variables (which can be labeled as; “Staff, Space, Stuff”) were not factored 
into our calculations.
Due to limitations in the data we were not able to distinguish between the need for neonatal, 
pediatric and adult ventilators; in reality the type of ventilator used would differ by age of 
patient, and would require additional planning.
Finally, we implicitly assumed in these calculations that all ventilated patients would die 
without such intervention. Because the risk of death for a patient who does not receive 
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mechanical ventilation is unknown, we may have overestimated the potential benefits of 
ventilation.
The estimates of ventilators derived from this analysis based on several pandemic scenarios 
can guide planning for a future pandemic. Stockpiling ventilators can be informed by these 
estimates, and should include assumptions about ventilators that are currently held in 
Federal and state stockpiles as well as those located in US hospitals.
Our results demonstrate that the next influenza pandemic will likely produce a surge in 
patients, admitted to hospitals under current standards of medical care, who will require 
mechanical ventilation. It must be acknowledged that in pandemics caused by influenza 
strains that cause large numbers of critically ill patients, there may not be the ability to meet 
peak demand for ventilation. Thus, public health officials, hospital administrators and 
practicing physicians need to develop plans now as to how to allocate scarce ventilators 
[20]. If ventilator capacity becomes scarce, then each hospital or group of hospitals need to 
consider how they will practically and ethically prioritize patients be placed on a ventilator. 
Powell et al [21] describe a triage system developed for use in New York state hospitals that 
included the following components: “duty to care, duty to steward resources, duty to plan, 
distributive justice, and transparency.” The authors considered their triage system to be a 
radical shift from ordinary standards of care.”
The challenge for public health authorities is to plan and prepare how to best respond to the 
next pandemic that will cause such a rapid and large demand for mechanical ventilation in 
critically ill patients. Ventilator preparedness planning has to be prioritized against 
competing influenza pandemic preparedness planning efforts. The time to start planning is 
now, and the results presented here may help guide such efforts.
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Technical Appendix
Table A1
Published estimates of the distribution of severity of ventilated patients
Study
Distribution of severity of ventilated patients*
High scores Low scores Source
Venkata et al. 0.17 0.83 14
Kim et al. 0.8 0.2 16
Dominguez-Cherit et al. 0.41 0.59 7
Pereira et al. 0.32 0.68 8
Ferreira et al. 0.31 0.69 10
ANZIC Influenza Investigators 0.28 0.72 5
Kumar et al. 0.17 0.83 6
*
Severity was assessed, in these studies, by either SOFA or APACHE scores.
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Table 2
Input values used to calculate the probability of mortality (i.e., failure) whilst on a mechanical ventilator.
Variable
% patients with “high 
severity scores”*
% patients with "lower 
severity scores"* Source
Distribution of ventilated patients by severity of illness* 30% 70% 10
% Mortality associated with being on invasive mechanical 
ventilator**
54% 25% 2–10
Calculated weighted average mortality*** 33.7% Calculated
*
Severity of illness of patients upon admission to ICU, as measured by metrics such as SOFA and APACHE scores, and is correlated with 
probability of survival after being placed on invasive mechanical ventilation. Distribution based on reviewed references (5–8, 10, Appendix Table 
A1).
**
Risks of mortality estimates are based on estimates of mortality as reported in a number of studies. See Appendix Table A1.
***
Calculated as weighted average of risk of mortality between “higher severity” and “lower severity” patients, with the weights being the 
distribution of patients in each category of severity score. See text for details.
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